The observation coalition "My Vote" has repeatedly informed the public about the schemes, forms, and individuals allegedly involved in rigging the parliamentary elections held on October 26. This time, we wish to tell you about the involvement of the Central Election Commission (CEC) in the election fraud process.
The evidence at our disposal, as well as publicly available evidence, demonstrates that the electoral administration played a significant role in implementing a large-scale election-rigging scheme orchestrated by the ruling party. Specifically:
The CEC did not fulfill its promise that the quality of the ballot paper would ensure voter confidentiality on election day. The ballot was printed on thin paper, allowing individuals present at electronic voting stations to identify the choices made by voters. This decision by the CEC enabled the ruling party to extensively control voters' choices on election day using both election commission members and video cameras installed near voting booths and counting machines.
Moreover, without public discussion or consultation with involved parties, the CEC unlawfully and arbitrarily altered the rule defined by the election code two months and nine days before the election. Instead of determining the roles of registrars by lottery on election day, the CEC set the date for this lottery one week before the election. As a result, most observation organizations were unable to monitor this process. Furthermore, changes in the procedure for appointing individuals working with verification devices and determining their identities a week in advance facilitated and made it possible to influence these individuals to comply with the ruling party's interests.
This same CEC decision led to the non-transparent assignment of roles responsible for queue management and marking procedures to precinct election commission members. We remind the public that the failure to follow marking rules throughout election day significantly contributed to the success of the fraud scheme. The failure to mark voters made it possible for individuals to vote using someone else's identification card and personal number.
Despite the CEC's public commitment that there would be no impediments to observing the verification process, election day presented a starkly different reality: registration tables were positioned against walls in a way that prevented observers from fully monitoring the process. In cases where our observers were allowed to stand behind verification devices, commission members instructed them to move away, stating that they did not have the right to observe from that location. In certain cases, our observers were deliberately expelled from polling stations for attempting to monitor the verification process.
There is evidence that the ruling party allowed individuals to cast votes on behalf of those who were not present in Georgia or at their registered address. Implementing such a large-scale scheme would have been impossible without the involvement of the election administration. It is also noteworthy that the CEC's decision not to open additional polling stations abroad increased the number of citizens who could not participate in the elections. This decision by the CEC facilitated the ruling party's plan to allow others to vote in place of individuals who were not in Georgia or at their registered address.
Throughout election day, reports emerged that certain voters were not allowed to vote because they were supposedly listed for mobile ballot boxes and their votes had already been cast. According to information provided to our observation organization, individuals visited their homes on behalf of the election administration, promising to include them in the mobile ballot box list and deliver the mobile ballot box to their homes on election day. However, the mobile ballot box was not brought to them, restricting their voting rights, and in all likelihood, others voted in their place.
At several polling stations abroad, in cities with large emigrant voter populations, the voting process was hindered by inadequate infrastructure and a shortage of registrars, endangering the entire electoral process — many voters were unable to vote, and the health of voters, observers, and commission members was put at risk.
According to information circulated by opposition parties and the media, the election administration appointed family members and affiliates of Georgian Dream (the ruling party) representatives as precinct election commission members and chairpersons. It is now clear that the purpose of appointing commission members in this way was to implement a large-scale election-rigging scheme. Commission members obstructed observation efforts by monitoring organizations, acted aggressively, verbally and physically insulted observers, and reacted irritably to written complaints. They facilitated the presence of unauthorized individuals at polling stations, recorded and monitored voters, and relayed voter information to the ruling party's so-called "call centers."
Throughout election day, there were numerous reports of voting using someone else's identification card and personal number, verification process failures, marking procedure violations, malfunctioning marking fluids and flashlights, and violence against representatives of observation organizations. The CEC chairman did not respond to violations and did not instruct commission members or relevant services to react. This raises a substantiated suspicion that the CEC was complicit in the events occurring at polling stations.
It is noteworthy that, according to media reports, the CEC issued accreditation to Russian propaganda media outlets, including a Russian propagandist accredited by NTV, Aleksandr Malkevich, who is known to have violated Georgia's "Law on Occupied Territories." He is wanted by U.S. security services [1] for allegedly interfering in U.S. elections, with a reward of $10 million for his capture. [2] The CEC secretary is responsible for his accreditation.
We remind the public that the ruling party amended the law to enable Giorgi Kalandarishvili to assume the position of CEC chairman, a move criticized by international organizations. As evident today, it was important for the ruling party to have Giorgi Kalandarishvili in this position to advance the party's interests during the election period.
Analysis of video materials from CEC meetings confirms that CEC chairman Giorgi Kalandarishvili was actively involved in making illegal decisions to support the desired scheme, along with his deputy Giorgi Sharabidze and CEC secretary Giorgi Javakhishvili.
We fully recognize that conducting an effective investigation is currently unrealistic under conditions where all state institutions, including investigative services, are under the control of the ruling party. However, at a minimum, the actions of the aforementioned individuals constitute neglect of official duty under Article 342 of the Georgian Criminal Code. If intent is confirmed, this would amount to an offense under Article 332 of the Georgian Criminal Code (abuse of official authority) in conjunction with electoral offenses, including Article 162 (obstructing the exercise of electoral rights), Article 164 (violation of voting secrecy), Article 164-2 (participation in elections based on a forged document), Article 164-3 (election fraud), and Article 164-4 (influence on voters' will). Therefore, we call on the Prosecutor's Office to initiate an investigation into the alleged official misconduct of CEC representatives.
Finally, it is important to note that the CEC was only one of several state agencies involved in this large-scale election-rigging scheme. The observation mission continues to investigate other aspects and will inform the public in due course.