The Parliament of Georgia has supported legislative amendments [1] on the creation of the Anti-Corruption Bureau in three readings. Strengthening the independence of the Anti-Corruption Agency and rigorously addressing cases of high-level corruption is one of the recommendations given to Georgia by the European Commission for granting the status of an EU candidate country.                                              

The version that was first initiated provided for the general coordination functions of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, while after the second reading, a number of important functions were added to the draft law, including those related to the monitoring of financial activities of political parties and completion and monitoring of asset declarations. Due to the need to ensure that these amendments are reflected in ensuing laws, the lawmakers initiated an additional legislative package, which was also passed in all three readings.   

Giving the anti-corruption functions envisaged by the Law on the Anti-Corruption Bureau to one institution should be welcomed and is in compliance with international practice. However, the centralized model only works in the event of granting this institution real independence and relevant (investigative) powers.

In this respect, the Law on the Anti-Corruption Agency is flawed, because it does not grant investigative powers to the Bureau. In other words, the function of investigation of corruption crimes still remains under the State Security Service and the Prosecutor’s Office. Without investigative powers, the Anti-Corruption Bureau will not be able to fight effectively against high-level corruption. It is precisely “rigorously addressing high-level corruption cases“ that is called for in Recommendation 4 given to Georgia by the European Commission.

The procedure of appointment of the Head of the Bureau is also problematic. Appointment of the Head of the Bureau by the Prime Minister cannot ensure the real independence of this institution, which is a necessary precondition for its effective work and is also a requirement of Recommendation 4 given by the European Commission. This guarantee would be provided by election of the Head of the Bureau by the Parliament as a result of a consensus among political parties. 

Accordingly, if the flaws related to the independence of the Anti-Corruption Bureau and the relevant powers are not addressed, the agency will not be able to meet the challenge of high-level corruption in the country.

In view of the foregoing evaluation, it is desirable to forward the Law on the Anti-Corruption Bureau to be evaluated by the Venice Commission or by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and to eliminate the flaws in the law in accordance with the evaluation of these organizations.