Analysis of the Court Judgment in the Presidential Palace Fence Case - საერთაშორისო გამჭვირვალობა - საქართველო
GEO

Analysis of the Court Judgment in the Presidential Palace Fence Case

06 November, 2026

I. Key Findings

  • The judgment delivered by Tbilisi City Court in the case concerning the events of 4 October 2025 fails to meet the standard required of a reasoned conviction: the body of evidence does not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the convicted persons committed any of the offences with which they were charged.
  • The court equated peaceful political protest with the organisation of violent crime and disregarded the constitutional and Convention guarantees protecting freedom of expression.
  • The legal classification of the charges is unsupported:

o   Article 317: No call to violence creating a clear, direct and imminent danger was established;

o   Article 225: The existence of a group formed by prior agreement and acting in an organised manner was not substantiated;

o   Article 222(2)(a): There is no evidence establishing that a group acted with a common intention to blockade or seize the Presidential Palace.

  • The possibility that the crime was provoked — in particular, through the prior damage to the fence — was not effectively investigated. The physical evidence was neither seized nor preserved in accordance with procedural requirements, while the repeated expert examination was conducted on the basis of photographs.
  • Individual criminal responsibility, particularly that of Paata Burchuladze, Irakli Nadiradze, Paata Manjgaladze and Irakli Shaishmelashvili, was not established. Nor can the admissions of the other defendants and the plea agreements they concluded be treated as evidence of the guilt of those individuals.

These shortcomings raise serious questions as to possible violations of the right to a fair trial and the principle of legality, as guaranteed by Articles 6 and 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, the lengthy prison sentences imposed despite the unsupported charges also violate the principle of proportionality enshrined in Articles 10 (freedom of expression) and 11 (freedom of assembly and association) of the Convention.

II. Introduction

On 7 May 2026, Judge Irakli Khuskivadze of Tbilisi City Court delivered a judgment concerning the events that took place in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace on 4 October 2025.

The court found the defendants guilty of various offences, including organising, leading and participating in group violence under Article 225 of the Criminal Code (CC); attempting to seize or blockade an object of strategic or special importance under Article 222(2)(a); and publicly calling for the violent alteration of the constitutional order and the overthrow of state authority under Article 317.

The court sentenced Paata Burchuladze, Murtaz Zodelava, Irakli Nadiradze, Paata Manjgaladze and Lasha Beridze to seven years’ imprisonment; Irakli Chkhirkvia, Tornike Mchedlishvili, Guram Zhvania and Nika Gventsadze to five years’ imprisonment; and Irakli Shaishmelashvili to two years’ imprisonment.

The judgment is inadequately reasoned and is not based on a consistent body of clear and compelling evidence capable of establishing the guilt of each convicted person beyond reasonable doubt. Furthermore, even if it had been established that the convicted persons had indeed committed the offences of which they were accused — which was not the case — the sentences imposed by the court were excessively severe and disproportionate to the alleged social dangerousness of their conduct.

In assessing the case, it is particularly important to determine several closely interrelated issues: what actually happened on 4 October 2025; whether the events that unfolded that day were in fact organised, or whether they were organised at all; whether any prior agreement existed between the convicted persons; and, if the answers to the preceding questions are affirmative, what role each convicted person played in the events leading up to and during 4 October 2025.

The judgment of Tbilisi City Court describes the events that took place near the Presidential Palace on 4 October in considerable detail. However, this is precisely where the main legal questions arise: are the facts established by the court sufficient to demonstrate that what occurred was not merely a spontaneous violent incident, but rather organised group violence, the organisation or direction of which was specifically entrusted to these individuals? Could the violent acts have been provoked by the authorities themselves, as there was reasonable suspicion to believe from the outset, a suspicion that continues to concern the public? And did the court manage to establish each convicted person's individual role to the degree required by criminal procedure law in order to impose criminal liability?

These questions are particularly important given that an analysis published by Transparency International Georgia well before the judgment was delivered had identified a number of circumstances that cast serious doubt on the prosecution's version of events:1

  • The problem of the legal classification of the alleged conduct, including the inadequate legal assessment of political statements made before 4 October — in particular, whether organising a civic and political protest can automatically be equated with organising a violent crime;
  • The absence of credible evidence demonstrating allegedly pre-planned and organised activity aimed at overthrowing the government;
  • The possibility of provocation by the State, including the possibility that the fence surrounding the Presidential Palace had been damaged in advance;
  • Problems concerning the preservation and examination of physical evidence, among other matters.

Our examination of the judgment has shown that, from the perspective of an objective observer, the court established the occurrence of violent incidents with a degree of adequacy. However, it failed entirely to substantiate the claim that this violence formed part of a specific, pre-agreed “criminal plan” from the outset — a plan attributed to the convicted persons by the prosecution and the court. It is equally unclear what role each convicted person allegedly played in carrying out this supposed “criminal plan”.

Our conclusions are not affected by the fact that one of the ten persons convicted in the case was pardoned, while five pleaded guilty and entered into plea agreements with the prosecution. First, the likely motivation behind such admissions is readily understandable. Where justice is not administered fairly in a country, people often feel compelled to make concessions in order to secure their release, as this may be their only means of regaining their personal freedom We need look no further than the recent statement by Irakli Kobakhidze, who once again said, with reference to Paata Burchuladze, that he would “leave prison very easily2” if he admitted his guilt and expressed remorse. Second, under the principle of individualisation of criminal responsibility, the “admission” by one or more convicted persons that they committed an offence plainly does not mean that the other convicted persons committed that offence as well.

III. What the Court Found

According to the court's judgment:

·       Before 4 October 2025, Murtaz Zodelava, Paata Burchuladze, Irakli Nadiradze, Irakli Shaishmelashvili and others made “public calls for the violent alteration of the constitutional order of Georgia and the overthrow of the State order”, with the aim of “mobilising citizens hostile to the authorities, gathering them together and involving them in violent acts”;3

·       Until and including 4 October, Irakli Shaishmelashvili “sought to demoralise law-enforcement officers and called on them not to perform their official duties and not to obstruct persons participating in ‘violent acts’”, thereby seeking to “achieve his objectives, which were directed towards the violent alteration of the constitutional order of Georgia and the overthrow of state authority”;4

·       On 4 October 2025, the day of the local self-government elections, Murtaz Zodelava, Paata Burchuladze, Irakli Nadiradze, Lasha Beridze, Paata Manjgaladze and others stated through the mass media that they themselves were organising and directing “group violent acts”;5

·       On the same day, at a protest rally held in Freedom Square, Paata Burchuladze presented to the assembled citizens an action plan allegedly drawn up by them, according to which “the participants in the group violence were to immediately detain individual representatives of the authorities” and “carry out various unlawful measures of coercion against persons they considered undesirable”;6

·       After Paata Burchuladze announced the alleged criminal plan, Murtaz Zodelava called on the rally participants to move together towards the administrative building of the President of Georgia, which they would “seize by force”, and instructed them not to obey law-enforcement officers;7

·       Paata Burchuladze, Irakli Nadiradze, Lasha Beridze, Murtaz Zodelava, Paata Manjgaladze and other persons allegedly involved in the “group violence” then proceeded from Freedom Square towards the President's administrative building;8

·       In the streets around Orbeliani Square, the “participants in the group violence” deliberately destroyed municipal and privately owned property in the surrounding area by using heavy objects and setting fires; some of the property was also used to erect barricades on the roadway;9

·       After the “organisers of the criminal acts” and the other participants reached the Presidential Administration, they allegedly “damaged the metal fence as a group” in order to “seize” the building. Murtaz Zodelava, Paata Burchuladze, Irakli Nadiradze, Lasha Beridze and other participants in the “group violent acts” then entered the courtyard of the Presidential Administration building, where they verbally and physically assaulted law-enforcement officers;10

·       Irakli Chkhirkvia, Tornike Mchedlishvili, Nika Gventsadze and Guri Zhvania participated in the group violent acts.11

Thus, the court treated the events it had itself described as components of a single criminal plan. It found that there had been an attempt to blockade or seize an object of strategic and special importance, accompanied by group violence and preceded by calls for the violent alteration of the constitutional order of Georgia or the overthrow of state authority.

The court stated:

“The court notes that the events of 4 October 2025 had been organised in advance and that preparations for them had begun some time earlier. This is confirmed by the public statements and calls made by the persons charged with organising the group violence, which were disseminated through various mass media outlets several days before the local elections. Those statements referred to the need for a revolutionary process, the implementation of a ‘peaceful overthrow’, the actions planned for 4 October and a plan drawn up in advance. The calls in question were addressed to a broad audience, were public and explicit in nature, and were intended to bring about the violent alteration of the constitutional order of Georgia and the overthrow of state authority. The persons involved in organising the crime — Paata Burchuladze, Irakli Nadiradze and Murtaz Zodelava — actively participated in these actions. Irakli Shaishmelashvili also called on the public to bring about the violent alteration of the constitutional order and the overthrow of state authority. The evidence submitted in the case also confirms that the defendants Murtaz Zodelava, Irakli Nadiradze, Paata Burchuladze, Lasha Beridze and Paata Manjgaladze organised the group violent acts. It was established that, before the rally took place, these individuals addressed the public in a joint public statement and indicated that they were the organisers of the October 2025 rally.”12

IV. Substantive Factual and Legal Deficiencies in the Court's Judgment

In the above-mentioned publication by Transparency International Georgia, which examined the legal basis for the charges brought against the individuals now convicted in connection with the events of 4 October 2025, we concluded that none of the charges was based on a proper assessment of the events and facts that occurred before, or on, 4 October 2025.

A. The constituent elements of the alleged offences are not established

a) The constituent elements of Article 317 of the Criminal Code are absent, since Paata Burchuladze and the other defendants were acting within the scope of their freedoms of expression and assembly

It is true that, for some time before 4 October 2025, several individuals who have since been convicted in this case, as well as Levan Khabeishvili, who was arrested several weeks before 4 October, repeatedly stated that Ivanishvili's regime would be “peacefully overthrown” on 4 October. The government's propaganda claimed that the term “peaceful overthrow” was an oxymoron and that the very concept of “overthrow” necessarily implied violent acts.

However, what the government's propaganda outlets said and continue to say is one thing; what an independent, objective and impartial judicial authority must have before it when convicting a person of calling for the violent overthrow of the government is quite another.

In our earlier publication, we pointed out that there is no answer to the question whether the word “overthrow”, for the purposes of Article 317 of the Criminal Code, inherently implies violence, since no authoritative interpretation exists. Judicial practice and criminal-law doctrine are equally silent on this matter. The very fact that the defendants consistently used the expression “peaceful overthrow” in their public statements indicates that they did not intend a “violent overthrow”. Accordingly, at the very least, the subjective element of the offence is absent.

We also referred to a principle established in the case law of the US Supreme Court, according to which a clear distinction must be drawn between, on the one hand, advocating even an abstract idea of violently changing the government and, on the other, inciting specific acts intended to bring about its overthrow. Unlike the latter, advocacy is protected by the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the US Constitution.13

We also noted that, under Article 4(2) of Georgia's Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression, a call gives rise to liability under the law only where a person commits an intentional act that creates a clear, direct and substantial danger of an unlawful consequence occurring. We suggested that this provision may represent a codification of the above-mentioned principle developed by the US Supreme Court.

Tbilisi City Court did not trouble itself with any such analysis. It simply concluded that, because the defendants had made public statements about the “overthrow” of the government, they had therefore committed the offence under Article 317 of the Criminal Code — calling for the violent alteration of the constitutional order of Georgia or the overthrow of state authority.

It is noteworthy that, alongside the statements concerning the “overthrow” itself, the court also treated as criminal the defendants' references to “the need for a revolutionary process”. It is obvious that, whether intentionally or otherwise, the court reproduced the government's propaganda narrative by treating references to a “revolution” as equivalent to calls for the “violent overthrow” of the government. First, the word “revolution” does not appear anywhere in the Criminal Code. Accordingly, neither calling for a revolution nor even carrying one out is, in itself, considered a criminal offence. Second, the experience of Europe's Velvet Revolutions in the late 1980s, as well as that of Georgia's own Rose Revolution — whatever the propaganda of the Ivanishvili regime may claim about it — demonstrates that a revolution does not necessarily entail the violent replacement of a government.

As evidence allegedly establishing the offence under Article 317 of the Criminal Code, the court referred to statements made by Paata Burchuladze at the mass rally on 4 October and to the “Declaration of the National Assembly” that he read out.14

The Declaration stated:

“We, the citizens of Georgia, gathered at the National Assembly, declare that our homeland has been seized. The so-called government has lost the trust of the people, and state institutions no longer reflect the will of the Georgian people. The Constitution of Georgia states that the source of state authority is the people. Today, the people are reclaiming their power from the usurper in order to protect peace, security and national interests. The informal rule of Bidzina Ivanishvili has created a real threat to Georgia's sovereignty and to every citizen.”

Paata Burchuladze then asked the people gathered in Freedom Square to endorse the following three propositions:

“The National Assembly declares that power belongs entirely to the Georgian people!”

“The National Assembly declares that, following the falsified elections of 26 October and the lack of international recognition, the so-called government has constitutionally lost its legitimacy and its authority has therefore ceased!”

“The National Assembly declares a peaceful transitional period which will ensure the peaceful assumption of power by the people themselves, the liberation of democratic institutions, the immediate resumption of dialogue on accession to the European Union, and the protection of the country's security and peace.”15

The court also referred to statements made by Murtaz Zodelava following Paata Burchuladze's speech, including: “...the Georgian people have reclaimed their power!”; “...the power of men will begin to act today...” ; “...the Georgian people should begin reclaiming their own centres of power...” ; and “We will now gather and take possession of the keys to the Presidential Palace. This [will be] our first step. The next step will follow...” and other statements.16

These statements are protected by the constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression, since they contain no call to violence. In particular, the Declaration of the National Assembly read out by Paata Burchuladze was a symbolic and ceremonial document. No court with even a modicum of objectivity would have characterised it in legal terms as calling for the violent alteration of the constitutional order or the overthrow of the government.

Incidentally, the court made an outright false statement when it claimed in its judgment that Paata Burchuladze had called on the people gathered at the rally to “detain individual representatives of the authorities”.17

In fact, Paata Burchuladze stated: “From this moment on, the Ministry of Internal Affairs must obey the Georgian people, not Bidzina Ivanishvili. As soon as they deviate from this, they are obeying bandits and a junta. Let us also raise our voices for them to hear on one very important issue. Now, as our first decision, we must decide on six members of the ‘Dream’ — who are the main criminals in our country, who have brought us to this point — and demand their immediate detention and transfer to prison.” He then named Irakli Kobakhidze, Shalva Papuashvili, Anzor Chubinidze, Mamuka Mdinaradze, Tea Tsulukiani and Bidzina Ivanishvili. 18

A call addressed to law-enforcement authorities to arrest Ivanishvili and his associates cannot possibly be regarded as unlawful. It is merely a call for law-enforcement agencies to act within the powers conferred on them by law.

Taken as a whole, the statements made by Paata Burchuladze, as well as those made by the other convicted persons before 4 October 2025 and at the rally held in Freedom Square on that date, were political statements falling within the scope of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. Punishing a person under criminal law for making such statements constitutes a flagrant violation of the principle of proportionality guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

As regards Murtaz Zodelava's specific statements about “the power of men”, we will not assess them, since Zodelava has already pleaded guilty. It is sufficient to note that, under the principle of individualisation of responsibility, only Zodelava can be held responsible for his own statements.

Before concluding our discussion of the absence of the constituent elements of Article 317, we must address one further issue that has not, to date, been discussed. As already noted, the court regarded the events that unfolded before and on 4 October 2025 as the implementation of a single criminal plan. In the court's own words, the defendants intended to overthrow the government by force; publicly called on the public to do so; established an organising group for that purpose; organised the mass rally on 4 October to achieve that objective; and, for the same purpose, called on the people gathered at the rally to proceed to the President's residence and forcibly break into the building. The fact that they failed to prove any of this is a separate matter. But even if this narrative were theoretically correct, it would follow that the defendants must have committed the offence under Article 315(1) and/or (2) of the Criminal Code — “conspiracy” or “rebellion” aimed at violently altering the constitutional order of Georgia, overthrowing or seizing state authority. The point, however, is that the defendants were not only never convicted of “conspiracy” or “rebellion”; they were not even charged with either offence.

In any event, this discrepancy alone is enough to demolish the narrative constructed by the prosecution and the court, both subservient to the Ivanishvili regime, concerning the events that took place before and on 4 October 2025.

b) The constituent elements of Article 225 of the Criminal Code are absent, since there is no body of evidence establishing the organisation or direction of group violence

It is undisputed that, on 4 October 2025, some of the demonstrators who arrived at the Presidential Palace became involved in physical confrontations with members of the Palace security staff and, subsequently, with the special forces who unexpectedly emerged from the Palace, where they had apparently been hiding until then.

However, the fact that several, or even many, people participated in violent acts at the same time does not, in itself, mean that “group violence” had automatically taken place as a pre-planned and organised operation with an organiser and a leader.

Under Article 225(1) of the Criminal Code, the offence consists of “organising or directing group actions accompanied by violence, rioting, damage to or destruction of another person's property, the use of weapons, resistance to a representative of the authorities using weapons, or an attack on such a representative”.

Accordingly, when applying Article 225 of the Criminal Code, particular importance attaches not only to the fact that violence occurred, but also to whether that violence was organised or whether a specific person participated in organising or directing it. The court was therefore required to establish not merely that violence had actually taken place, but also that the relevant individuals had devised or organised a plan for violent action in advance and had put in place a mechanism for carrying it out.

As we have repeatedly pointed out when assessing the cases of individuals arrested during the events of November and December 2024 and subsequently convicted, according to the established case law of the Supreme Court of Georgia, a necessary element of the offence of “organising, directing or participating in group violence” under Article 225 of the Criminal Code is the existence of group action organised in advance. Spontaneous joint action is insufficient to establish the constituent elements of the offence.19

More specifically, according to the established case law of the Supreme Court, for defendants to be found guilty of an offence under Article 225 of the Criminal Code, the prosecution must present a body of relevant evidence capable of convincing an objective observer beyond reasonable doubt that the participants in the group violent acts:

  • had joined together in advance for the purpose of organising, directing or participating in a group offence;
  • acted in agreement with a specific person and carried out that person's assignments or instructions, or themselves issued assignments or instructions of some kind.

c) The constituent elements of Article 225 of the Criminal Code are absent

The participants must have acted by prior agreement, as a group and in an organised manner, rather than spontaneously in response to a particular situation at a particular moment;

They must have been aware of the purpose of the organised criminal group and known of the existence of a common intention to engage in criminal activity or of the group's intention to commit the relevant offences.

It is worth noting that, in the cases of persons arrested during the November–December 2024 crackdowns, the courts changed the original charge of “group violence” and convicted the defendants under Article 226 of the Criminal Code. That reclassification was also unlawful. Nevertheless, it indicates that, even in the view of the courts controlled by Ivanishvili, an accusation of organising or participating in “group violence” requires a body of unequivocal evidence proving the existence of a group that had reached a prior agreement to commit violent acts.

In the case concerning the events of 4 October 2025, five persons — Murtaz Zodelava, Paata Burchuladze, Irakli Nadiradze, Lasha Beridze and Paata Manjgaladze — were convicted of organising and directing “group violence”. The remaining defendants were held criminally liable for participating in that alleged “group violence”.

First and foremost, the court again made a false statement when it claimed that Murtaz Zodelava, Paata Burchuladze, Irakli Nadiradze, Lasha Beridze, Paata Manjgaladze and others had announced through the mass media that they themselves were “organising and directing the group violent acts”. 20 They made no such statement.

It is true that Paata Burchuladze identified himself, together with Murtaz Zodelava, Irakli Nadiradze, Lasha Beridze and Paata Manjgaladze, as members of the organising group for the protest rally. However, those individuals deny having done so. 21 In any event, even if they had identified themselves in that way, organising a peaceful protest is one thing; organising violence is quite another. There is a fundamental difference between the two. Accordingly, even if those individuals had stated that they were indeed organisers of the peaceful protest rally, that would not have entitled the court, in the absence of any other unequivocal evidence, to conclude that they were also organisers of violent acts.

Organising a large political gathering or demonstration may involve mobilising participants, arranging a stage, equipment and transport, coordinating communications and developing political messages. Such activities do not, in themselves, mean that the organisers planned violence in advance.

To bridge this distinction as a matter of law, the court had to demonstrate a specific factual link. For example, it had to establish who had agreed to violent acts, when and how; who had issued the relevant instructions; who had provided the means necessary to carry out the violence; who had decided which object would be targeted; or what other conduct pointed to a prior criminal agreement.

The judgment identifies no such specific evidence. The court's conclusion that these individuals organised violent acts is therefore nothing more than speculation. Under criminal procedure law, speculation cannot form the basis of a conviction.22

d) The constituent elements of Article 222(2)(a) of the Criminal Code — the group seizure or blockade of an object of strategic or special importance — are absent, since there is no body of evidence establishing group action

Under Article 222(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, it is a criminal offence to seize or blockade “a television or radio broadcasting or communications facility, or an object of strategic or special importance, thereby disrupting or potentially disrupting the normal operation of that facility or object”, where the offence is committed “by a group”. The defendants were convicted of attempting to commit this offence.

Here, too, the allegation concerns an attempt to commit an offence by a “group acting by prior agreement”. Accordingly, the reasoning set out above in relation to Article 225(1) of the Criminal Code is equally relevant. The case contains no body of evidence proving an attempt to commit this offence as a group, and, naturally, the court did not identify any such evidence. As already noted, spontaneous actions cannot establish that an offence was committed by a group.

Furthermore, the individual roles of Paata Burchuladze, Murtaz Zodelava, Irakli Nadiradze, Lasha Beridze and Paata Manjgaladze in the conduct covered by this provision have not been established. Although they were present near the Presidential Palace, there is no indication that their aim was to blockade or seize it.

B. Possible provocation of the offence: the Presidential Palace fence as one of the central problems with the judgment

As we discussed at length in our earlier research, in the days following the events of 4 October 2025, reasonable suspicion arose in the public domain that the offences attributed to the defendants had been provoked by the Georgian Dream regime.

In particular, a report broadcast on the 11 October 2025 edition of TV Pirveli's programme Nodar Meladze's Saturday gave rise to reasonable suspicion that a section of the fence surrounding the Presidential Palace — which collapsed after only a few people pushed against it — had been cut in advance and attached to the rest of the structure with wires. 23 Close-up footage filmed by the television channel's camera operator showed that the metal support posts which, according to the official version, had been broken down by the demonstrators were not even deformed.

It is also noteworthy that, despite Murtaz Zodelava's public statement, broadcast by television channels, that the protesters should go to the Presidential Palace “to hand over the keys”, only eight security officers were in the Palace courtyard. The Special Tasks Department unit was lying in wait inside the Palace building and came outside only after part of the fence had collapsed.

In this context, particular significance attaches to a statement made by Irakli Kobakhidze on 3 October 2025, the day before the rally, concerning the organisers of the 4 October protest. He said that the organisers' “little surprise” would be met with a “big surprise”. The defence asked the court to examine Irakli Kobakhidze as a witness in order to establish what he had meant by a “big surprise”. The court rejected that application.

All of the above gave rise to reasonable suspicion that the regime had laid a trap for the protesters in advance, with the aim of staging an apparent attempt to seize the Presidential Palace and thereby justifying the criminal measures subsequently taken against the participants in the protest.

Only an objective investigation and an impartial court could have dispelled that suspicion. They manifestly failed to do so.

a) The fence was not seized and properly secured as evidence; it was not even stored in accordance with the prescribed procedure

The reasonable suspicion, described above, that the fence had been damaged in advance could have been dispelled by the regime's own law-enforcement system if it had demonstrated that the fence had not been cut beforehand. However, the case materials show that the fence was not seized, procedurally secured or even stored in accordance with the prescribed rules.

According to the case materials, the items seized during the inspection of the Presidential Palace courtyard were sealed. However, the damaged sections of the fence and the stone slabs were handed over unsealed to a representative of the State Security Special Service, who was not warned of the liability for damaging or destroying evidence. Subsequently, the fence was stored unsealed on the premises of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The head of the investigative body responsible for the case was apparently unaware of where it was being kept.24

Under Article 77(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia, “physical evidence must be examined and sealed; during the examination, the individual and generic characteristics of the object must be identified and described”.

Under Article 3(25) of the same Code, “physical evidence” is defined as “an object, document, substance or other item which, by virtue of its origin, the place and time at which it was discovered, its characteristics or the traces remaining on it, is connected with the factual circumstances of a criminal case and may serve as a means of detecting a crime, identifying the perpetrator, or refuting or confirming the charge...”.

Under Article 79(1) of the same Code, physical evidence must be stored under conditions that preclude its loss or alteration of its properties. Article 79(4) provides that physical evidence may be stored elsewhere.

As a result of these flagrant violations of the above provisions, the investigative authorities not only failed to ensure that one of the key items of physical evidence in the case was procedurally secured and stored in accordance with the prescribed rules; they also deprived the defendants of access to evidence that could have served as a principal means of refuting the prosecution's case.

b) Suspicious circumstances surrounding the examination of the fence: the so-called experts did not inspect the fence itself to determine whether it bore signs of having been cut in advance

On 5 October 2025, the Ministry of Internal Affairs' Forensic-Criminalistics Department prepared an engineering and trace-evidence examination report concerning the damage to the fence. However, the report did not address important questions regarding the mechanism of the damage or the possibility that the fence had been cut beforehand. In response to the suspicions that had arisen in the public domain, a second engineering and trace-evidence examination was ordered. Yet this repeat examination was conducted solely on the basis of photographs taken during the inspection of the scene. According to the report, dated 16 October 2025, no traces of cutting were detected on five sections of the fence.25

c) The court's findings concerning the cutting of the fence and possible provocation of the offence

The court relied on the testimony given at trial by Otar Khaburdzania, one of the authors of the trace-evidence examination report, as well as on the report prepared on 16 October 2025 by Khaburdzania and his colleague, Lasha Sulamanidze. According to Otar Khaburdzania, the fence bore no traces of cutting.26

The court placed full confidence in both Khaburdzania's testimony and the report. It noted that, according to the expert witness, “the conclusion is categorical that the fence bore no traces of cutting”. 27 However, the judgment makes no mention of the fact that the “experts” had reached their “conclusion” that there were no traces of cutting not by inspecting the fence itself for that specific purpose, but on the basis of photographs of the fence. 28

Thus, the investigation failed to ensure an objective examination of whether the Presidential Palace fence bore traces of having been cut in advance. The damaged sections of the fence were not properly seized, sealed or stored, while the repeat examination, specifically ordered to establish whether the fence had been cut beforehand, was conducted on the basis of photographs rather than an inspection of the fence itself. Nevertheless, the court accepted the experts' conclusions as categorical and failed to take account of their fundamental deficiency. As a result, the reasonable suspicion of possible provocation remained unaddressed, seriously undermining the reasoning and reliability of the judgment.

In Tchokhonelidze v. Georgia, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights on the ground that the domestic authorities — the prosecution and the courts — had failed to ensure an effective and fair examination of a substantiated complaint that the police had incited the commission of the offence. The prosecution had made no attempt to refute the allegations of entrapment and had failed to discharge its burden of proving that no entrapment had taken place.29

C. Failure to individualise criminal responsibility: the court failed to establish the role played by each convicted person in the offences of which they were found guilty

Another major deficiency in the judgment is the failure to establish individual criminal responsibility.

Criminal law does not recognise the principle of collective responsibility. This principle is firmly established not only in the criminal justice systems of individual democratic states, but also in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.

In particular, the Strasbourg Court has repeatedly held that a person cannot be held liable for an offence committed by someone else. Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights enshrines the principle of nulla poena sine culpa (“no punishment without guilt”). It protects the right of every individual not to be punished unless their personal responsibility has been duly established.30 Establishing personal responsibility requires proof not only of the objective elements of the offence, but also of its subjective element — the existence of a mental link (mens rea)31.

a) Scope of the assessment

In assessing the judgment in this case, the decisive question is not merely whether the court established that acts of violence had occurred in connection with the events of 4 October 2025. It is also necessary to examine how the court linked each defendant's specific conduct to those events and, consequently, how it substantiated that defendant's individual criminal responsibility.

b) The court's method of determining the defendants' roles

As already noted, the reasoning section of the judgment shows that the court described the events of 4 October 2025 as a series of interconnected actions and assessed the defendants' conduct in the context of the events as a whole. This is where the central problem with the reasoning becomes apparent: the court failed to distinguish each defendant's individual conduct from the general picture it had itself constructed.

If the court chose to place the actions of several individuals within a single scheme, it was required to explain further precisely what conduct each individual engaged in, in what manner and with what intent, in participating in the relevant offence. The court failed to do so.

c) The failure to substantiate individual responsibility in respect of four defendants

In this part of our assessment, we address the four convicted persons who did not express a wish to plead guilty or enter into plea agreements.

Paata Burchuladze

The court should have distinguished between his public statements, his role in planning and organising a peaceful protest rally, and any role he may — or may not — have played in organising and directing violent acts.

In particular, the court should not have focused on what Paata Burchuladze said about the Ivanishvili regime or on the content of the declaration he read out during the rally on 4 October itself. Rather, it should have identified the specific conduct on his part that could objectively have led the court to conclude that the violence near the Presidential Palace had been incited, planned, organised or directed by Paata Burchuladze. The judgment does not even describe any such specific conduct, let alone identify evidence proving that it occurred.

The only fact apparent from the video evidence in the case is that Paata Burchuladze did enter the courtyard of the Presidential Palace after the fence collapsed easily under pressure from several people, and that he soon returned after tear gas was sprayed in his face. However, this fact does not indicate that he organised the actions intended to bring down the Palace fence, that he participated in violent acts, or that he intended, through such conduct, to blockade or seize the Presidential Palace.

As noted above, the evidence in the case indicates that the events near the Presidential Palace did not bear the hallmarks of an organised group's actions at all; rather, they were spontaneous in nature.

Accordingly, the court's conclusion that Paata Burchuladze organised the violent acts through which an attempt was also made to blockade or seize the Presidential Palace, and that all of this was intended to overthrow the government, amounts to nothing more than an unfounded and unsubstantiated assumption.

Irakli Nadiradze

Here, too, the essential question in assessing the individual's responsibility is whether the court distinguished his active participation in a peaceful protest from conduct that directly constituted the elements of a criminal offence.

The judgment does not describe a single act that would indicate that Irakli Nadiradze committed any of the three offences of which the court found him guilty.

Like Paata Burchuladze, he did make political statements against the Ivanishvili regime, which clearly fell within the scope of freedom of expression, and he also entered the courtyard of the Presidential Palace. However, there is not a single piece of evidence showing that he organised or even incited violent acts, that he sought to blockade or seize the Presidential Palace, or that he acted with such an intention.

Paata Manjgaladze

The reasoning in the judgment concerning Paata Manjgaladze is even less substantiated than that concerning any of the other persons convicted in connection with the events of 4 October 2025. Not only is there no evidence that Paata Manjgaladze organised violent acts — particularly given that the very fact that such acts were organised was not established — but there is not even any evidence in the case that Manjgaladze was present near the Presidential Palace at all. According to Paata Manjgaladze himself, he attended the rally in Freedom Square with his underage children and did not even proceed towards the Presidential Palace.

Generally speaking, an organiser's presence at the scene of a crime is not a prerequisite for establishing this form of participation in an offence. However, in this particular case, the file should have contained a credible and convincing body of evidence demonstrating Manjgaladze's involvement in organising the violent acts. The only evidence specifically cited by the court in relation to Paata Manjgaladze is that Paata Burchuladze named him as one of the organisers of the rally. First, Burchuladze was referring to participation in organising the peaceful part of the protest rally. Second, Paata Manjgaladze himself denies having participated even in organising the peaceful rally held in Freedom Square. According to him, he had no prior knowledge either of the speakers scheduled to address the rally or of the content of their statements. There is no evidence in the case file to refute his account.

Irakli Shaishmelashvili

The central issue in substantiating his responsibility is what specific conduct the court considered criminal and how it established a connection between that conduct and the actions of the other defendants. The court did not even attempt to explain what evidence established that Shaishmelashvili knew of the so-called criminal plan, shared it and intentionally participated in its implementation. It could not have done so, because it had likewise failed to establish the existence of any pre-arranged criminal plan in respect of the other defendants.

The only evidence that the court regarded as proving that Irakli Shaishmelashvili had committed an offence consisted of his calls on law-enforcement officers not to obey the criminal orders of their superiors. Such calls do not constitute a criminal offence.

V. Conclusion

  • The judgment delivered by Tbilisi City Court in the so-called Presidential Palace fence case concerning the events of 4 October 2025 fails to meet the requirements of a reasoned conviction. The facts established by the court and the evidence examined do not form a consistent, sufficient and convincing body of evidence capable of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that the convicted persons committed any of the offences attributed to them.
  • The court failed to distinguish between organising a peaceful political protest and organising a violent crime. Political statements, demands for a change of government, discussion of a revolution or a “peaceful overthrow”, and participation in organising a protest rally do not, in themselves, establish an intention to commit a violent crime or participation in its commission. Any criminal-law assessment of such conduct required due regard to the constitutional and Convention guarantees of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.
  • The constituent elements of the offence under Article 317 of the Criminal Code have not been adequately substantiated. The court did not establish that the convicted persons' statements contained calls for violence that went beyond the scope of freedom of expression and created the clear, direct and substantial danger required by law. In effect, the court equated political statements about a change of government and a revolutionary process with calls for the violent alteration of the constitutional order. The lengthy terms of imprisonment imposed in the absence of a substantiated charge also violate the principle of proportionality enshrined in Articles 10 (freedom of expression) and 11 (freedom of assembly and association) of the Convention.
  • The organisation and direction of group violence under Article 225 of the Criminal Code have not been established by adequate evidence. The existence of violent incidents does not, in itself, prove the existence of a group acting pursuant to a prior agreement and in an organised manner. The court was required to establish a specific agreement, a common criminal intent, the issuing of assignments or instructions, or other circumstances capable of distinguishing spontaneous actions from pre-planned violence. The judgment does not adequately identify or assess any such evidence.
  • The legal classification of the conduct as an attempt to commit the offence under Article 222(2)(a) of the Criminal Code is likewise unsubstantiated. The court did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the convicted persons had acted as a group, pursuant to a prior agreement and with a common intention to seize or blockade the Presidential Palace. Nor did it adequately identify each individual's conduct or the intention to commit the relevant offence.
  • The possibility that the Presidential Palace fence had been damaged in advance and that the offence had been provoked was not effectively investigated or adequately assessed by the court. The damaged sections of the fence were not seized in accordance with the prescribed procedural rules, sealed or stored under appropriate conditions. The repeat expert examination was conducted on the basis of photographs rather than an inspection of the fence itself. In these circumstances, the court's categorical acceptance of the expert report and its disregard of the defence's arguments concerning possible provocation seriously undermine the reliability of the judgment.
  • The court also failed to provide adequate reasoning establishing the individual criminal responsibility of each convicted person. A general description of the events and the linking of the defendants' political or public activities cannot replace evidence proving that a specific individual committed a specific offence. The conclusions reached in respect of Paata Burchuladze, Irakli Nadiradze, Paata Manjgaladze and Irakli Shaishmelashvili are particularly problematic. In their cases, the court's reasoning fails to answer the central question: precisely what conduct, with what intent and on the basis of what evidence, constituted each individual's participation in the offence attributed to them.
  • The fact that various defendants pleaded guilty or entered into plea agreements cannot substitute for individual proof of the guilt of the other convicted persons. The principle of individualisation of responsibility requires that each person's guilt be assessed on the basis of the evidence against that person, rather than inferred from another person's admission of guilt.
  • The judgment raises serious questions as to whether the right to a fair trial was violated. Where a court fails to address material defence arguments, does not examine substantiated allegations of possible provocation, fails properly to assess deficiencies in the storage and examination of physical evidence, and relies on a general picture of events instead of establishing the individual roles of the defendants, there are grounds to question whether the proceedings complied with the requirements of Articles 6 and 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In this regard, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is particularly important, including Tchokhonelidze v. Georgia, which concerns the obligation to ensure an effective and fair examination of substantiated allegations of possible entrapment.
  • The severity of the sentences imposed on the convicted persons raises further questions as to the fairness of the punishment. Where the constituent elements of the offence, the participation of particular individuals and their intentions have not been adequately substantiated, the imposition of lengthy terms of imprisonment is especially problematic. Sentencing must be based on an assessment of the conduct actually committed by each convicted person, the degree of their culpability and their individual circumstances.
  • Ultimately, the fact that violent incidents occurred during the events of 4 October 2025 did not relieve the court of its obligation to establish who participated in the commission of an offence, with what intention and in what capacity. Proof that violence occurred does not automatically establish the existence of a pre-arranged criminal plan, the organisation or direction of that plan by specific individuals, or a common intention to overthrow the government by force.
  • Thus, the fundamental legal problem with the judgment lies in the substantial gap between its description of the events and its reasoning as to criminal responsibility. The court characterised the events of 4 October 2025 as a single criminal plan, but failed to present sufficient evidence capable of proving beyond reasonable doubt the existence of such a plan, each convicted person's participation in its implementation, or their individual intent. These circumstances call into question the lawfulness and adequacy of the judgment's reasoning and make a comprehensive, independent and objective review by a higher court essential.

 

Endnotes

1. Transparency International Georgia, “Analysis of the Presidential Palace Fence Case: A Trap Laid in Advance?”, 28 January 2026, https://transparency.ge/ge/blog/prezidentis-sasaxlis-gobis-sakmis-analizi-cinascar-dagebuli-maxe.

2. GHN, 30 October 2026, “If he expresses remorse, repents and admits his guilt, he will leave prison very easily — Irakli Kobakhidze on Paata Burchuladze”, https://www.ghn.ge/news/355941-tu-ikneba-misi-mkhridan-sinanulis-gamokhatuleba-monanieba-aghiareba-am-shemtkhvevashi-is-dzalian-martivad-datovebs-sapatimros-irakli-kobakhidze-paata-burchuladzeze.

3. Judgment of Tbilisi City Court of 7 May 2026, Case No. 1/7642-25, Investigation No. 090041025001, p. 5.

4. Ibid., p. 5.

5. Ibid., p. 5.

6. Ibid., p. 5.

7. Ibid., p. 5.

8. Ibid., pp. 5–6.

9. Ibid., p. 6.

10. Ibid., p. 6.

11. Ibid., pp. 6–7.

12. Ibid., para. 3.19, p. 54.

13. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).

14. Judgment of Tbilisi City Court of 7 May 2026, Case No. 1/7642-25, Investigation No. 090041025001, para. 3.20, pp. 54–55.

15. Materials of Criminal Case No. 090041025001, Vol. 1, pp. 16–17.

16. Judgment of Tbilisi City Court of 7 May 2026, Case No. 1/7642-25, Investigation No. 090041025001, para. 3.21, p. 55.

17. Ibid., p. 5.

18. Materials of Criminal Case No. 090041025001, Vol. 1, p. 17.

19. Transparency International Georgia, “Politically Motivated ‘Group Violence’ Case against 8 Protest Participants”, 11 March 2025, https://transparency.ge/ge/post/ec-jgupuri-zaladobis-politikurad-motivirebuli-sakme-protestis-8-monacilis-cinaagmdeg; and “Politically Motivated ‘Group Violence’ Case against 11 Protest Participants”, 4 April 2025, https://transparency.ge/ge/post/ec-jgupuri-zaladobis-politikurad-motivirebuli-sakme-protestis-11-monacilis-cinaagmdeg.

20. Judgment of Tbilisi City Court of 7 May 2026, Case No. 1/7642-25, Investigation No. 090041025001, p. 5.

21. Ibid., paras. 2.17–2.18, 2.20 and 2.22, pp. 13–16.

22. Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia, Article 269(2).

23. TV Pirveli, weekly programme Nodar Meladze’s Saturday, 11 October 2025, “A Trap for the People — Was the Fence Cut in Advance?”, https://tvpirveli.ge/ka/siaxleebi/politika/112093-makhe-khalkhistvis-iko-tu-ara-gobe-tsinastsar-gadachrili.

24. Transparency International Georgia, “Analysis of the Presidential Palace Fence Case: A Trap Laid in Advance?”, 28 January 2026, https://transparency.ge/ge/blog/prezidentis-sasaxlis-gobis-sakmis-analizi-cinascar-dagebuli-max.

25. Ibid.

26. Judgment of Tbilisi City Court of 7 May 2026, Case No. 1/7642-25, Investigation No. 090041025001, paras. 2.15 and 2.45, pp. 13 and 34.

27. Ibid., para. 3.25, p. 59.

28. Materials of Criminal Case No. 090041025001, Vol. 4, pp. 22–28.

29. Tchokhonelidze v. Georgia, no. 31536/07, 28 June 2018, §§ 47–53.

30. G.I.E.M. S.r.l. and Others v. Italy [GC], nos. 1828/06 and 2 others, 28 June 2018, §§ 242–244 and 271–274; Varvara v. Italy, no. 17475/09, 29 October 2013, §§ 66 and 71.

31. Yasak v. Türkiye [GC], no. 17389/20, 5 May 2026, § 193; G.I.E.M. S.r.l. and Others v. Italy, § 242; Sud Fondi S.r.l. and Others v. Italy, no. 75909/01, 20 January 2009, § 116.

 

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