Quite a long time has passed since the events of 4 October 2025. Despite the existence of differing opinions regarding these events even within the segment of society that is critically opposed to the Ivanishvili regime, one thing is clear: the regime’s efforts to have these events characterized—both domestically and internationally—as an alleged attempt to violently change the constitutional order or overthrow the government, and to use them as a pretext to suppress the ongoing, continuous civic protest in the country, failed just as all previous similar attempts had failed.

The principal reason for this failure is the well-founded suspicion prevailing in society that, in reality, there was no plan or even intent to “overthrow” the government, and that what occurred was the result of the authorities entrapping a portion of the protest participants and, consequently, provoking the commission of criminal offences. This is compounded by the manifest lack of grounds for the legal classification of the charges brought—an issue that has become a harmful and entrenched practice within Georgia’s law-enforcement and justice systems.

All of this provides a sufficient basis to conclude that the persons charged in connection with the events of 4 October, as well as all persons detained, charged, or convicted during the more than year-long continuous civic protest, are victims of political persecution and, accordingly, political prisoners.

In a country where more than 230 public officials, including 47 judges and 17 prosecutors, are subject to international sanctions, political persecution has become an ordinary occurrence.

1.     Charges Brought Against the Defendants in Connection with the Events of 4 October

Criminal prosecution in connection with the events of 4 October 2025 is being conducted against 66 individuals.

For the purposes of this analysis, we will examine only the criminal prosecution pursued against members of the so-called “Organising Committee.” These individuals are the world-renowned bass singer Paata Burchuladze, the politicians Murtaz Zodelava, Irakli Nadiradze, Lasha Beridze, and Paata Manjgaladze.

Paata Burchuladze, Murtaz Zodelava, and Irakli Nadiradze are charged under the Criminal Code (CC) of Georgia with:

• Article 317 (“Public calls for the violent change of the constitutional order of Georgia or for the overthrow of state authority”), which carries a penalty of up to three years’ imprisonment;
• Article 225(1) (“Organisation or leadership of group violence”), punishable by six to nine years’ imprisonment;
• Article 222(2)(a) (“Seizure or blockade of an object of strategic or special importance, committed by a group, which disrupted or could have disrupted the normal functioning of the institution or object”)—attempted offence—punishable by two to four years’ imprisonment.

Lasha Beridze is charged with the offence under Article 225(1) CC and with an attempt to commit the offence under Article 222(2)(a) CC.

Paata Manjgaladze is charged under Article 225(1) CC.

2.     Chronology of the Events of 4 October 2025

On 4 October 2025, tens of thousands of people gathered in Tbilisi at Freedom Square, on Rustaveli Avenue, and in the surrounding streets to protest against the policies implemented by the Ivanishvili regime over the previous two years, including the mass falsification of the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024; steps taken against Georgia’s European future; the pursuit of anti-democratic legislative policies; and the suppression of the media, civil society, and critical opinion in general.

The protest was preceded by public statements made by certain politicians and public figures, including Paata Burchuladze, as well as Levan Khabeishvili, Irakli Nadiradze, Murtaz Zodelava, and others, regarding the “peaceful overthrow” of the Ivanishvili regime. As a result of these statements, Levan Khabeishvili was arrested as early as 11 September 2025.

On 4 October 2025, at Freedom Square, Paata Burchuladze read out the Declaration of the National Assembly:

“We, the citizens of Georgia, gathered at the National Assembly, declare that our homeland has been captured. The so-called government has lost the trust of the people; state institutions no longer reflect the will of the Georgian people. The Constitution of Georgia states that the source of state authority is the people. Today, the people are reclaiming their power from the usurper in order to protect peace, security, and national interests. The informal rule of Bidzina Ivanishvili has created a real threat to the sovereignty of Georgia and to every citizen.”

Following this, Paata Burchuladze asked those gathered at Freedom Square to express their consent to the following resolutions:

·        The National Assembly declares that all power belongs to the Georgian people;

·        The National Assembly declares that the so-called government, following the falsified elections of 26 October and the lack of international recognition, has constitutionally lost its legitimacy and that its authority has therefore ceased;

·        The National Assembly declares a peaceful transitional period that will ensure the peaceful assumption of power, the liberation of democratic institutions, the immediate resumption of dialogue on accession to the European Union, and the protection of the country’s security and peaceful development.

Paata Burchuladze also called upon law-enforcement authorities to arrest Bidzina Ivanishvili, Irakli Kobakhidze, and four other senior officials of “Georgian Dream” under criminal law for crimes committed against the Georgian people.

Subsequently, Murtaz Zodelava addressed the crowd and called upon the so-called “male segment” of the crowd to go to the Presidential Palace in order to “take possession of the keys.”

Some of the citizens who went to the Presidential Palace began shaking the palace fence. After only a few pushes, one section of the fence collapsed, and several protest participants entered the palace courtyard. At that time, only eight members of the palace security staff were present in the courtyard. However, within seconds of the protesters’ entry, dozens of officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Special Tasks Department (STD), fully equipped with shields, helmets, batons, and tear gas, emerged from the palace building. They first expelled the protesters from the palace courtyard and then, with the assistance of additional police forces, including water-cannon vehicles, from the surrounding area, arresting several dozen protesters.

3. Problems with the Legal Classification of the Charges

(a) Article 317 of the Criminal Code (Calls to violently overthrow Georgia’s constitutional order or to topple the state authorities): Charges are in conflict with the Freedom of Expression

For a certain period prior to 4 October 2025, several individuals arrested on that date, as well as Levan Khabeishvili—who was arrested several weeks earlier—repeatedly stated that the “peaceful overthrow” of the Ivanishvili regime would take place on 4 October. Government propaganda claims that the term “peaceful overthrow” is an oxymoron and that “overthrow” necessarily implies violence.

Article 317 CC defines the offence as follows:

“Public calls for the violent change of the constitutional order of Georgia or for the overthrow of state authority, or dissemination of material containing such calls, as well as calls to take up arms for the same purpose.”

From the wording of the offence, it is evident that not every call is punishable, but only those that contain an element of violent change of the constitutional order, overthrow of state authority, or calls to arms. Thus, violence and armament are essential elements of the offence.

There is no authoritative interpretation clarifying whether the term “overthrow” inherently implies violence. No judgments under Article 317 CC can be found in the databases of general court decisions. The very fact that the defendants consistently used the phrase “peaceful overthrow” in their public speeches indicates that they did not intend a violent overthrow.

According to the European Court of Human Rights, the scope for restricting freedom of expression is narrow in cases involving political expression.[1] The question of whether a restriction on freedom of expression was justified must be determined by assessing whether the expression was capable of leading or actually led to disorder.[2]

Moreover, under Article 4(2) of the Law of Georgia on Freedom of Speech and Expression, a call gives rise to legal liability only where a person intentionally commits an act that creates a clear, direct, and substantial danger of an unlawful result.

This provision of Georgian law likely codifies the principle established in the case law of the United States Supreme Court, according to which a fundamental distinction exists between the advocacy of an abstract idea of overthrowing the government and incitement to concrete actions aimed at achieving that objective. Advocacy is protected by the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, whereas incitement to specific action is not.[3]

From this perspective, statements made prior to 4 October concerning a “peaceful overthrow” should not be taken into account at all, as they fall within the scope of advocacy of an abstract political idea and cannot be regarded as incitement to specific action, given that they did not contain a concrete plan of action. Accordingly, these statements are protected by the constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression.

A separate question is whether any of the statements made by the defendants during the protest on 4 October could be regarded as incitement to the violent change of the constitutional order or the overthrow of state authority.

The Declaration of the National Assembly read by Paata Burchuladze, cited above, was a document of a symbolic and ceremonial nature and cannot be legally classified as an act aimed at violently changing the constitutional order or overthrowing the government. Likewise, the call addressed to law-enforcement authorities to arrest Ivanishvili and his associates cannot be considered unlawful.

In our view, Murtaz Zodelava’s statement calling for “taking possession of the keys” to the Presidential Palace was also symbolic in nature. He made no explicit call for violence. Ultimately, whether such a statement constitutes incitement to the violent change of the constitutional order or the overthrow of state authority is, of course, a matter for judicial assessment—but not for a politically biased judiciary of the kind that has emerged in Georgia under the Ivanishvili regime.

In any event, regardless of how the events at the Presidential Palace on 4 October 2025 might be assessed under other provisions of the Criminal Code, they cannot be characterized as a “violent change of the constitutional order” or an “overthrow of the government,” since, under the Constitution of Georgia, the President is not a centre of power, and the “blockade” or “seizure” of the presidential residence—even if successfully carried out—could not affect the stability of the constitutional order or state authority.

(b) Article 225(1) of the Criminal Code (Organisation or leadership of group actions): No evidence of group action

Under Article 225(1) CC, the offence consists of:

“Organisation or leadership of group actions accompanied by violence, looting, damage to or destruction of another’s property, use of weapons, resistance to or assault on a representative of the authorities with the use of weapons.”

As we have repeatedly pointed out in assessing the cases of persons arrested and subsequently convicted in connection with the events of November–December 2024, the established case law of the Supreme Court of Georgia holds that a necessary element of the offence under Article 225 CC—organisation, leadership, or participation in group violence—is the existence of a pre-organised group action. Spontaneous collective action is insufficient to establish the offence.

Specifically, according to the Supreme Court’s settled practice, in order to convict defendants under Article 225 CC, the prosecution must present a body of evidence sufficient to convince an objective observer beyond reasonable doubt that the participants in the group violent act:

• had prior agreement to organise, lead, or participate in a group offence;
• acted in coordination with specific individuals and carried out instructions or issued instructions themselves;
• acted pursuant to prior agreement, in an organised and group manner, rather than spontaneously in response to a specific situation at a specific time;
• were aware of the objective of the organised criminal group and knew of the intent to engage in common criminal activity or to commit the offences in question.

Notably, in the cases of individuals arrested during the riots of November–December 2024, courts ultimately reclassified the original charge of “group violence” and convicted the defendants under Article 226 CC instead. Although that outcome was also unlawful, it nonetheless demonstrates that even courts under Ivanishvili’s control require a conclusive body of evidence proving the existence of a pre-organised group formed for the purpose of committing violent acts.

While there may have existed a group advocating the idea of the “peaceful overthrow” of the Ivanishvili regime, there is no evidence in the cases concerning 4 October 2025 that any member of such a group organised violent acts.

(c) Article 222(2)(a) of the Criminal Code (Seizure or blockade of a strategic facility): No evidence of group action

Under this provision, the offence consists of the “seizure or blockade of a broadcasting, communications, or strategic or specially important facility, which disrupted or could have disrupted its normal functioning,” committed “by a group.” The defendants are charged with an attempt to commit this offence.

Since the charge is brought under Article 222(2)(a) CC, it concerns an attempted offence committed by a “group acting by prior agreement.” Accordingly, the considerations outlined above in relation to Article 225(1) are equally applicable. No body of evidence exists in the case demonstrating an attempted group offence under this provision. As already noted, spontaneous actions cannot serve as proof of a group offence.

Moreover, the individual roles of Paata Burchuladze, Murtaz Zodelava, Irakli Nadiradze, Lasha Beridze, and Paata Manjgaladze in relation to this offence are not established either. Although they were present at the Presidential Palace, there is no indication that they aimed to block or seize it.

It is noteworthy that, without the “group element,” Article 222(1) CC provides for a maximum penalty of up to two years’ imprisonment. Thus, the charge has been artificially aggravated.

4.     Was Part of the Fence Cut in Advance?

Regardless of whether the actions of any defendant display elements of the offences described above, there are circumstances giving rise to a well-founded suspicion that the alleged offences were provoked by the “Georgian Dream” regime.

On 11 October 2025, the television programme Nodar Meladze’s Saturday aired a report raising serious doubts that the section of the Presidential Palace fence that collapsed after only a few pushes had been cut in advance and attached to the rest of the structure with wires. Close-up footage filmed by the broadcaster’s camera operator shows that the iron support posts allegedly destroyed by protesters were not even deformed.

It is also noteworthy that, despite Murtaz Zodelava’s publicly broadcast statement that protesters should go to the Presidential Palace to “take possession of the keys,” only eight security guards were present in the palace courtyard, while the STD unit was lying in wait inside the building and emerged only after part of the fence collapsed.

In this context, particular attention should be paid to the statement made by the so-called Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze on 3 October 2025, the day before the protest, in which he warned the organisers that their “small surprise” would be met with a “big surprise.” The defence’s motion to summon Kobakhidze as a witness to clarify what he meant by a “big surprise” was dismissed by the court.

All of this gives rise to a well-founded suspicion that the regime deliberately set a trap for the protesters, staged an imitation of the seizure of the Presidential Palace, and used this to justify criminal measures against protest participants. As described below, the prosecution failed to dispel the doubt expressed in the television report.

5.     Failure to Seize and Properly Secure the Fence as Evidence

The aforementioned suspicion regarding prior damage to the fence could have been dispelled by the law-enforcement system itself had it demonstrated that the fence had not been cut in advance. However, the case materials show that the fence was neither properly seized nor procedurally secured or stored.

According to the case file, the inspection of the Presidential Palace courtyard took place during the night of 4–5 October, between 03:10 and 08:10. The inspection was conducted, and the corresponding inspection report drawn up, by Zurab Kuprava, Senior Investigator of the Central Criminal Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Participants included witness Irakli Zaalishvili, representing the Special State Protection Service of the Presidential Administration; Senior Investigator Giorgi Khelashvili; Senior Experts Tamaz Latsabidze and Zurab Jamaspishvili; and Expert Mariam Tamazashvili. No other persons took part.[4]

Several items were seized and sealed, including two iron posts uprooted from the pavement near the gate of the fence, another post from the palace courtyard, fragments of paving stones, and others.[5] However, the damaged fence sections themselves, together with the stone slabs beneath them, were neither sealed nor procedurally secured in accordance with criminal-procedural law and were returned to Irakli Zaalishvili, a representative of the Special State Protection Service[6], as confirmed by his signed receipt.[7] Neither the inspection report nor the receipt indicates that Zaalishvili was warned of criminal liability for damage to or destruction of the material evidence entrusted to him.

According to the case materials, the fence was “stored” without sealing on the premises of a building belonging to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the former Ceremonial Palace). Notably, the Director of the Central Criminal Police Department, Davit Kiknadze—the authority conducting the investigation—did not even know where the fence was stored and had to inquire with the Special State Protection Service.[8]

The subsequent fate of the fence is unknown. It was likely destroyed or reinstalled at its original location.

6.     Violations of Criminal Procedural Law Regarding the Fence

The failure to seize, seal, and properly store the fence—one of the main items of material evidence—constitutes a gross violation of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) of Georgia.

Under Article 77(2) CPC, “material evidence must be inspected and sealed; during inspection, the individual and generic characteristics of the object must be identified and described.”

Article 3(25) CPC defines “material evidence” as “an object, document, substance, or other item which, by its origin, place and time of discovery, characteristics, or traces left on it, is connected with the factual circumstances of a criminal case and may serve as a means of discovering the offence, identifying the perpetrator, or refuting or substantiating the charge…”

Under Article 79(1) CPC, material evidence must be stored under conditions that exclude its loss or alteration of its properties; paragraph 4 of the same article allows for storage in another location.

As a result of these serious violations, the investigative authority not only failed to ensure the proper procedural securing and storage of key evidence, but also deprived the defence of access to evidence that could have served as a primary means of refuting the charges.

These circumstances reinforce the suspicion that the integrity of the fence may indeed have been compromised in advance—possibly by law-enforcement authorities—to enable protesters to knock down a section of it and enter the courtyard, thereby completing the elements of Article 222 CC. Confirmation or refutation of this suspicion has been rendered impossible by the potential destruction of the fence as evidence, and the defence has been deprived of the opportunity to inspect it or conduct its own expert examination.

7.     Dubious Circumstances Surrounding the Fence “Expert Examinations”: The So-called Experts Have Never Actually Seen the Fence Themselves

Following the inspection of the scene, on 5 October 2025, Investigator Vakhtang Esakia ordered a “complex traceological and commodity-valuation expert examination,” assigning it to the Forensic-Criminalistics Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.[9] The examination was conducted, but, as described below, the “experts” carried it out without ever seeing the fence itself.

On the same day, Deputy Director of the Department Vakhtang Chedia sent an engineering and traceological expert opinion to Investigator Esakia.[10] The opinion was prepared by senior experts Zurab Shanidze, Shalva Kintsurashvili, Otar Khaburzanija, and Lasha Sulamanidze.[11]

This brief “expert opinion,” totalling only three pages excluding photographs, devotes most of its content to the commodity-valuation aspect, i.e. assessment of damage. Its traceological section consists of a single paragraph stating that the fence sections were damaged, separated from welds and fastenings, deformed, and bore scratches and indentations, indicating damage caused by physical force and contact with a hard object.[12]

No further details were provided, including regarding possible prior damage to the fence. The experts thus left unanswered key questions, such as whether the fence had been compromised in advance; what type of “physical force” was applied; what “hard object” caused the damage; whether it is physically possible for several people to knock down a fence firmly embedded in concrete with only three or four pushes; why only one section collapsed while others withstood the pressure; and whether any tools were used. An “expert opinion” that fails to address these questions cannot be considered a professional and competent traceological examination.

The central question remains: on what basis did four senior experts prepare an opinion when there is no indication that the fence sections were delivered to the forensic institution or that the experts themselves inspected the fence on site.

After the broadcast of Nodar Meladze’s Saturday, on 15 October 2025, Investigator Esakia ordered a second traceological examination to determine whether the fence bore “cutting marks.”[13] Once again, the examination was assigned to the same department and based solely on photographs taken during the scene inspection.[14]

The examination was conducted by the same two experts, Otar Khaburzanija and Lasha Sulamanidze, who again did not inspect the fence in person. In their opinion dated 16 October 2025, they concluded that the damage resulted from breaking due to physical force (e.g. pushing) and that no cutting marks were present.[15]

The same questions arise with respect to this “expert opinion” as to the first. Ultimately, it cannot dispel the suspicion that the fence was cut in advance. These circumstances cast serious doubt on both the integrity and professionalism of the experts and the reliability of their conclusions.

8.     Provocation of a Crime

Under Article 145 CC, “provocation of a crime, i.e. inducing another person to commit a crime for the purpose of bringing that person to criminal liability,” constitutes a criminal offence.

The above circumstances give rise to a well-founded suspicion that:

(a) the collapsed fence section may have been cut in advance and attached with wire to allow it to be knocked down with minimal force, enabling protesters to enter the courtyard and come into physical contact with law-enforcement officers—something that would have been impossible without prior cutting; this assumption is further reinforced by Kobakhidze’s remarks about the so-called “big surprise;

(b) law-enforcement authorities failed to properly seize, seal, and store the fence as material evidence, ultimately resulting in its inaccessibility;

(c) expert opinions were falsified, and by destroying the fence, the defence was deprived of the opportunity to conduct its own examination.

These circumstances allow for the conclusion that the offences charged under Articles 225 and 222 CC may have been provoked by law-enforcement authorities, or that law-enforcement authorities are shielding those who provoked them.

9.     Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights Against Entrapment

The European Court of Human Rights has well-established case law concerning the entrapment of individuals into committing crimes.

According to the Court, law-enforcement authorities, including through undercover agents, must confine themselves to investigating one’s criminal activity in an essentially passive manner and must not incite offences.[16] Incitement occurs where police agents exert such an influence on the subject as to incite the commission of an offence that would otherwise not have been committed.[17]

The Court has developed a two-pronged test in entrapment cases, comprising substantive and procedural elements. The substantive test examines whether authorities confined themselves to passive investigation or incited the offence. The procedural test requires domestic courts to properly examine allegations of incitement. The burden of proof that no incitement occurred rests with the prosecution.[18]

In connection with the events of 4 October 2025, there is no indication that the prosecution or the courts took any steps to investigate allegations of provocation.

Conclusion

·        The authorities’ attempts, following the events of 4 October 2025, to portray them as an attempt to violently change the constitutional order or overthrow the government have failed. This failure stems from widespread domestic and international scepticism that the events involved any genuine coup plan or intent.

·        A well-founded suspicion has taken root in society and among professionals that the authorities deliberately sought to entrap some protest participants and provoke criminal offences in order to suppress large-scale civic protest and intimidate society.

·        The legal classification of the charges against the defendants is manifestly problematic. The application of Article 317 CC contradicts both the substance of the provision and constitutional and international standards on freedom of expression, as the necessary elements of violence or calls to arms are absent.

·        Statements about a “peaceful overthrow” constitute advocacy of a political idea rather than incitement to concrete violent acts and are therefore protected by freedom of expression.

·        The application of Article 225(1) CC is likewise unfounded, as there is no body of evidence demonstrating the existence of a pre-organised, coordinated, and violent group action, as required by Supreme Court case law.

·        Similarly, the attempt charge under Article 222(2)(a) CC has been artificially aggravated by simulating a “group element,” without evidence of prior agreement or individual actions indicating intent to seize or block a strategic object.

·        The circumstances surrounding the collapse of the Presidential Palace fence give rise to a well-founded suspicion that the collapsed section may have been damaged in advance. This is supported by video evidence and factual circumstances indicating prior readiness and controlled development of events by law-enforcement forces.

·        Particularly troubling is the failure to seize, seal, and properly store the fence as material evidence, in violation of fundamental requirements of criminal-procedural law and depriving the defence of the opportunity to conduct its own expert examination.

·        The “expert examinations” of the fence were conducted with serious procedural and professional deficiencies, undermining both the experts’ integrity and the reliability of their conclusions. Two traceological examinations were conducted without the experts ever visually inspecting the fence.

·        Taken as a whole, the factual and legal circumstances of the case provide a strong basis for concluding that the persons charged in connection with the events of 4 October are victims of political persecution and that the charges brought against them may be the result of provocation of a crime, in violation of both Georgian law and the established case law of the European Court of Human Rights.

[1] See, for example, Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, 25 November 1996, § 58.

[2]  Perinçek v. Switzerland, no. 27510/08, [GC], 15 October 2015, § 152.

[3] See, for example, Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).

[4] Case file N 090041025001, vol. 2, pp. 131-139.

[5] Ibid., pp. 134-138.

[6] Ibid., p. 136.

[7] Ibid., p. 130.

[8] Case file N 090041025001, vol. 4, pp. 13, 16.

[9] Case file N 090041025001, vol. 2, pp. 16-17.

[10] Ibid., p. 19.

[11] Ibid., pp. 20-22.

[12] Ibid., p. 21.

[13] Case file N 090041025001 vol. 4, pp. 19-20.

[14] Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[15] Ibid., pp. 22-28.

[16] Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, no. 44/1997/828/1034, 9 June 1998, § 38.

[17] Ramanauskas v. Lithuania, no. 74420/01, [GC] 5 February 2008, § 55.

[18] Matanović v. Croatia, no. 2742/12, 04 April 2017, §§ 121-130.